Plexa /v1/pretrade/check — pre-trade token safety check on Base: can you still sell thi…
Plexa /v1/pretrade/check — pre-trade token safety check on Base: can you still sell this token? avoid fires only on a trap proven on-chain now: no pool to exit into, an exit pot under 5% of your size, or the trading gate off (the honeypot shape). A drained po…
by api.getplexa.com · discovered, not yet claimed by its owner · updated 2026-10-08
Mirrored from Coinbase's public x402 Bazaar. The description is the provider's own text and has not been reviewed here; the payment requirements are copied as published.
What it does
Plexa /v1/pretrade/check — pre-trade token safety check on Base: can you still sell this token? avoid fires only on a trap proven on-chain now: no pool to exit into, an exit pot under 5% of your size, or the trading gate off (the honeypot shape). A drained pot is what a rug leaves behind — measured, not predicted. clear = no provable trap, NOT safe. risk_profile: token age, holder concentration, liquidity, transfer limits. Not financial advice.
Tags: bazaar · builder-code
Use with an agent
- Discover. Agents find this listing with
GET https://bazaar.saylorinnovations.com/discovery/search?query=…, the MCP toolsearch_resources, or/discovery/resources. - Inspect. Fetch
/resources/32511.jsonfor the price and payment options. - Pay. Call
GET https://api.getplexa.com/v1/pretrade/check. The provider answers402with its payment requirements. An x402 client signs one of the options below and retries withPAYMENT-SIGNATURE. - Execute. The provider returns
200with the data. Agent Bazaar is not in the request path and never sees your payment.
For humans
You don't need an account or an API key; you need a wallet holding a small amount of USDC on Base, Polygon, Arbitrum One, Solana, and an x402-capable client (see the examples below). Call the endpoint unpaid first to see exactly what it asks for.
Pricing & payment
- Price
- $0.05 / request
- Protocol
- x402 v2
- Auth
- No account or API key. Pay per request.
- Networks
- Base, Polygon, Arbitrum One, Solana
- Calls (30d)
- 26 · 2 unique payers (third-party data from the public x402 Bazaar)
x402 payment requirements
| Scheme | Network | Asset | Amount | Pay to | Timeout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| exact | Base eip155:8453 | USDC | $0.05 | 0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef | 300s |
| exact | Polygon eip155:137 | USDC | $0.05 | 0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef | 300s |
| exact | Arbitrum One eip155:42161 | USDC | $0.05 | 0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef | 300s |
| exact | Solana solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp | USDC | $0.05 | D6FqEyoFvkgGy4PpJjckHc3xRXhzL6mWQ25gz4rkVLor | 300s |
accepts[] (raw JSON)
[
{
"scheme": "exact",
"network": "eip155:8453",
"payTo": "0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef",
"asset": "0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913",
"amount": "50000",
"amountUsd": 0.05,
"maxTimeoutSeconds": 300
},
{
"scheme": "exact",
"network": "eip155:137",
"payTo": "0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef",
"asset": "0x3c499c542cEF5E3811e1192ce70d8cC03d5c3359",
"amount": "50000",
"amountUsd": 0.05,
"maxTimeoutSeconds": 300
},
{
"scheme": "exact",
"network": "eip155:42161",
"payTo": "0xd993eAfBA87cFfa2ca2CFF5A56EF89034575A7ef",
"asset": "0xaf88d065e77c8cC2239327C5EDb3A432268e5831",
"amount": "50000",
"amountUsd": 0.05,
"maxTimeoutSeconds": 300
},
{
"scheme": "exact",
"network": "solana:5eykt4UsFv8P8NJdTREpY1vzqKqZKvdp",
"payTo": "D6FqEyoFvkgGy4PpJjckHc3xRXhzL6mWQ25gz4rkVLor",
"asset": "EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v",
"amount": "50000",
"amountUsd": 0.05,
"maxTimeoutSeconds": 300
}
]Schemas
Output schema (JSON Schema)
{
"properties": {
"example": {
"properties": {
"confidence": {
"description": "high | medium | low. On \"avoid\" this is confidence IN THE TRIGGER, which is a measurement taken this call, so it is always \"high\" — a check that failed elsewhere does not make the measured trap less true. On \"clear\" it is how COMPLETE the checks were: fewer axes computed, lower confidence. On \"unknown\" it is capped at \"low\" by construction: the check the verdict depends on did not finish, so a high number there would contradict the verdict word next to it. Either way the gaps are reported explicitly — see `reasons` and the null fields in `risk_profile`.",
"type": "string"
},
"quote": {
"description": "Executable quote sub-result (realizable fill under size, not mid/spot)",
"type": "object"
},
"reasons": {
"description": "Human-readable reasons behind the verdict",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"risk_profile": {
"description": "Structural risk as measured DATA (age, concentration, liquidity incl. exitLiquidityUsd, oracle availability, transfer restrictions), each section with a plain-language note. Never a severity: these factors do not separate live from dead tokens [M, n=40].",
"type": "object"
},
"triggers": {
"description": "Proven traps that fired — CLOSED list (NO_EXIT_VENUE, EXIT_LIQUIDITY_DRAINED, TRADING_DISABLED), empty when verdict is \"clear\".",
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": "array"
},
"verdict": {
"description": "avoid | clear | unknown. \"avoid\" = a listed trap was PROVEN at this block (see `triggers`); \"clear\" = none of them fired AND the liquidity sweep reached a conclusion; \"unknown\" = none fired but the sweep did NOT reach a conclusion (`liquidityCoverage.conclusive: false`), so absence of a trap is not established — see the `exit-coverage-incomplete:<what>` line in `reasons`. \"clear\" is NOT a safety rating and NOT a prediction — structural risk lives in `risk_profile`. verdict semantics changed 2026-08-01 (v2): avoid = provable trap only; ok/caution are gone. 2026-08-27 (P67): a THIRD value \"unknown\" was added — it takes over the cases that used to answer \"clear\" while `liquidityCoverage.conclusive` was false. No existing value changed meaning; code branching on \"avoid\" is unaffected, and code branching on \"clear\" now gets strictly fewer, better-founded clears. 2026-09-21 (P96): a clear verdict now also requires the MEASURED sale of your position to return at least 90% of the size you asked about. Below that the answer is \"unknown\" with the reason exit-below-90pct — no trap was proven, but the exit we measured is not there at this size. Again strictly fewer clears; avoid is untouched.",
"type": "string"
}
},
"type": "object"
},
"type": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"type": "object"
}Example shape — generated from the schema, not a captured live response
{
"example": {
"confidence": "string",
"quote": {},
"reasons": [
"string"
],
"risk_profile": {},
"triggers": [
"string"
],
"verdict": "string"
},
"type": "string"
}Examples
curl "https://api.getplexa.com/v1/pretrade/check"
# -> 402 Payment Required, accepts[] lists how to pay
# retry with a PAYMENT-SIGNATURE (or PAYMENT header) once paidconst res = await fetch("https://api.getplexa.com/v1/pretrade/check");
if (res.status === 402) {
const { accepts } = await res.json();
// pay one of accepts[] via an x402 client, then retry with the payment header
}import httpx
res = httpx.get("https://api.getplexa.com/v1/pretrade/check")
if res.status_code == 402:
accepts = res.json()["accepts"]
# pay one of accepts[] via an x402 client, then retry with the payment headerDetails
- Provider
- api.getplexa.com
- Endpoint
- https://api.getplexa.com/v1/pretrade/check
- Machine-readable
/resources/32511.json